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Pursuit of profit
poisons collaboration
The CRISPR–Cas9 patent battle demonstrates how
overzealous efforts to commercialize technology can
damage science, writes Jacob S. Sherkow.

L

ast month, in an extraordinary dispute
before the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), university lawyers
laid out their clients’ legal strategies for
claiming patents that cover the celebrated
gene-editing technology CRISPR–Cas9.
Over the next year, the USPTO will receive
volumes of evidence centred on who first
invented the technology.
Battles over scientific priority are as old as
science itself. But the CRISPR–Cas9 patent
dispute is unusual because it pits two leading research institutions against one another
for the control and industrial development
of a foundational technology: the University
of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), and
the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
As scientific institutions increase their

involvement in the commercialization
of research1, it is worth considering the
potential consequences for science if more
institutions follow the path of UC Berkeley
and the Broad Institute.

HIGH STAKES

In May 2012, researchers at UC Berkeley,
led by Jennifer Doudna and her collaborator, Emmanuelle Charpentier (then located
at the University of Vienna in Austria) filed
a patent application in the United States for
CRISPR–Cas9. Seven months later, Feng
Zhang, a researcher at the Broad Institute,
filed a competing application that covered
similar uses of the technology. After Zhang’s
lawyers requested that his application be
fast-tracked, the USPTO awarded one patent to Zhang in April 2014, followed by a

1 7 2 | NAT U R E | VO L 5 3 2 | 1 4 A P R I L 2 0 1 6

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved

dozen more in the subsequent 12 months.
Meanwhile, the application made by Doudna
and her colleagues languished.
Last April, Doudna’s lawyers requested that
the USPTO conduct a specialized legal trial,
known as a patent interference, to determine
the ownership of the US patents that cover
the CRISPR–Cas9 system. This January, the
USPTO formally agreed to carry out the proceeding.
One conspicuous aspect of this case, in my
opinion, is the degree to which UC Berkeley
and the Broad Institute have weighed in on
what is essentially a dispute over scientific
priority.
The Broad Institute has produced press
releases, videos and a slick feature on its
website that stress the importance of Zhang’s
contributions to the development of the
CRISPR–Cas9 technology. And earlier this
year, the central positioning of Zhang’s work
in a historical perspective of CRISPR published in Cell 2 by the president and director
of the Broad Institute, Eric Lander, prompted
a storm of angry responses from scientists,
including Doudna and Charpentier. Meanwhile, at UC Berkeley, a press release that
discussed the potential of CRISPR described
Doudna as “the inventor of the CRISPR–Cas9
technology” (see go.nature.com/cm2gvx).
The financial stakes are high. The
CRISPR–Cas9 patents are widely viewed to
be worth hundreds of millions, if not billions,
of dollars. Both organizations have invested
directly in spin-off companies that were cofounded by their researchers — the Broad
Institute in Editas Medicine, co-founded by
Zhang, and UC Berkeley in Caribou Biosciences, co-founded by Doudna. A report
submitted by Editas in January to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission lists
the Broad Institute and other Harvard-affiliated institutions as owning a major equity
stake in the company: about 4.2% of its common shares (see go.nature.com/45c1ey).

DIFFERENT TIMES

Efforts to commercialize the research output
from universities played out differently in
the past. Since 1980, US universities have
been able to patent the inventions of their
researchers, thanks to the Bayh–Dole Act —
legislation that determines the ownership of
intellectual property arising from federally
funded research. But for the most part, institutions have kept their
distance from disputes
over scientific priority.
In fact, after factoring
in the costs of filing
patents and staffing,
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Even in the case of lucrative patents,
commercial development has frequently been
left to venture capitalists and the researchers
themselves. Take the Cohen–Boyer patents,
which covered early gene-splicing technology
and netted Stanford University and the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF),
both in California, hundreds of millions of
dollars in licensing fees during the 1980s
and 1990s. In this instance, Genentech, the
company in South San Francisco, California,
that was formed to commercialize the underlying technology, sprung from the efforts of
Herbert Boyer, one of the founding researchers, and the financier Robert Swanson. The
company was neither owned by, nor an exclusive licensee of, Stanford or UCSF.
Research institutions in general are starting to play a bigger part in shepherding their
researchers’ projects through the commercialization process. A 2014 report from the
Association of University Technology Managers in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois — an organization that supports managers of intellectual
property at academic research institutions,
non-profit organizations and government
agencies worldwide — documented that
universities are increasing equity investments
in their researchers’ start-up companies. Of
the patent licences granted by universities
in 2014, 10% were tied to such investments1,
compared with 6.7% in 1999 (ref. 4).
I am concerned that such involvement in
commercialization has the potential to clash
with the broader, educational mission of
research institutions.
Universities worldwide have long strived
to foster a culture of scientific collaboration.
Even when universities have obtained broad
patents, as the Carnegie Institute of Washington in Washington DC did in the early
2000s for a gene-expression control technology known as RNA interference, licences
have been cheap and easy for researchers to
obtain5. In other cases, scientists have simply ignored patents that cover fundamental
technologies6.
Academic research institutions now seem
less shy about taking each other to court for
patent infringement. In 2011, the University of Utah in Salt Lake City sued the Max
Planck Society for the Advancement of Science in Germany over claims to a patent that
covered a technology called short interfering
RNA, which inhibits gene expression (see
go.nature.com/vyujnp). And over the past
four years, Stanford University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong in Sha Tin have
engaged in a heated patent litigation over prenatal genetic diagnostic blood tests, a market
that was worth US$530 million in 2013.
In the current era of budget tightening, universities of all stripes might be tempted to use
licensing fees as another funding mechanism.
The University of South Florida in Tampa,
for example — a public institution that had
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its state funding cut by $48 million in 2012
— holds a substantial number of patents that
have not yet been licensed and has a famously
low ratio of patent-licence revenue to research
expenditure7. If its financial situation were to
deteriorate further, the university might be
compelled to extract licence fees from other
research institutions for those patents.

PATH TO PROFIT

It would be wrong to suggest that patents, writ
large, are failing educational research institutions. In the cases of gene splicing, RNA interference and human embryonic stem cells,
patents have been major earners for institutions and researchers
without damaging the “Efforts to
commercialize
scientific enterprise5.
But an obvious the research
danger of increasing output from
the focus on commer- universities
cialization is that edu- played out
cational institutions differently in
will view scientific the past.”
research as a path to
profit, above all else. It is not hard to imagine
that patent disputes might lead to university
administrators pushing certain views on their
scientists, denigrating collaboration with
researchers from competing institutions and
tasking tenure committees with valuing patents over publications.
Where scientific advances have the potential to be profitable, universities should
support researchers to bring that work to
fruition. This might include helping them to
secure patents. But it is my view that serious
commercialization efforts — such as granting
exclusive licences or receiving equity ownership in researchers’ start-ups — should be left
to industry.
The CRISPR–Cas9 dispute could have
played out very differently. Zhang and

Doudna were both co-founders of Editas.
And UC Berkeley and the Broad Institute
could have filed patent applications that listed
the research teams from both institutions as
co-inventors. Any resulting patents could
then have been freely or cheaply licensed to
other research institutions, or used to fund
a joint academic organization dedicated to
studying the technology. The patents could
also have been widely, but not exclusively,
licensed to a variety of industry competitors
— promoting a robust, competitive market
for commercial CRISPR–Cas9 applications
and creating a funding stream for further
academic research.
Biomedical research in educational institutions has long prided itself on a culture of
openness and sharing — one that both Zhang
and Doudna have exercised by donating various components of the CRISPR–Cas9 system
to the open-science consortium Addgene in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The incentives
that patents create for educational institutions should not be allowed to erode scientific
collaboration. ■
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